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VIII

I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
On November 10, 2012, at the Sagecrest apartment complex ("Sagecrest") in Meridian,

Idaho, a gas-burning water heater emitted lethal levels of carbon monoxide ("CO"), poisoning
teenagers McQuen Forbush and Breanna Halowell as they slept. No hard-wired CO detector was
there to warn or protect them from the danger. Mr. Forbush was killed; Ms. Halowell survived
but with a permanent brain injury.
Defendants/Respondents -

The Sagecrest Multi Family Property Owners' Association,

Inc. (the "POA'') and POA President Jon Kalsbeek

knew for well over a year before this

incident that the water heaters at Sagecrest posed a deadly threat (the air intakes were clogging,
causing the water heaters to burn improperly and emit CO), and that professional preventative
maintenance and hard-wired (as opposed to battery-powered) CO detectors were necessary
solutions. The property manager at Sagecrest, First Rate Property Management, Inc. ("FRPM")
wanted to take specific steps that would have saved Mr. Forbush and Ms. Halowell. But the
POA (through Mr. Kalsbeek) -

which had the power to hire, fire, and set FRPM's

compensation for managing unit interiors, and routinely micromanaged FRPM's activities in unit
interiors -

prevented FRPM from taking its proposed actions. As a result, Mr. Forbush and Ms.

Halowell were poisoned.
Plaintiffs/Appellants -

Mr. Forbush's parents and Ms. Halowell -

brought this action

against Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA. The district court granted summary judgment, holding that
neither Mr. Kalsbeek nor the POA owed any duties. Although normally a question of law, the

of a duty becomes a question of fact when it depends on disputed facts. The disputed
facts here preclude summary judgment.
First, Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA owed premises liability duties. An entity with control
over a premises owes duties proportionate to that control. Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA exercised
control over whether: (a) hard-wired CO detectors would be timely installed; (b) a professional
plumber would be hired to perform preventative maintenance; and (c) tenants and guests would
receive adequate warnings of the deadly CO threat.
Second, Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA owed duties resulting from their voluntary

undertakings to decide whether: (a) hard-wired CO detectors would be timely installed; (b) a
professional plumber would be hired to perform preventative maintenance; and (c) tenants and
guests would receive adequate warnings of the deadly CO threat. An additional element
reliance -

is also necessary. FRPM relied on Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA's decisions.

Third, the POA is vicariously liable for FRPM's acts and omissions. The POA exerted
control over whether: (a) hard-wired CO detectors would be timely installed; (b) a professional
plumber would be hired to perform preventative maintenance; and (c) tenants and guests would
receive adequate warnings of the deadly CO threat. FRPM was the PO A's agent with respect to
both unit exteriors and unit interiors at Sagecrest.

B.

Course of the Proceedings
The district court initially denied summary judgment for the POA. R. p. 642. It then sua

sponte gave notice of its intent to reconsider, R. p. 799, and subsequently granted summary

2

judgment, R. pp. 952-94, reasoning that the POA owed no duties, R. p. 977. The district court
found that the POA lacked control over unit interiors, R. pp. 977-86, and did not voluntarily
assume any duties, R. pp. 986-94. It applied the same reasoning and granted summary judgment
to Mr. Kalsbeek. 1 Tr. p. 106, L. 18 top. 112, L. 7; R. p. 949. Final judgment was entered, R. p.
996, and Plaintiffs timely appealed, R. pp. I 000-07.

C.

Statement of the Facts
1.

Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA exercised actual control over unit interiors.

Although Sagecrest unit owners exercised control over unit interiors, Mr. Kalsbeek and
the POA also exercised parallel control over unit interiors. FRPM Owner Tony Drost testified
that the POA, through Mr. Kalsbeek, controlled "global issues" at Sagecrest. R. p. 391 at Dep. p.
93, L. 14 top. 95, L. 19. This control extended to unit interiors:
A.
. ... Global issues consisted of the CO testing. Global issues consisted of
the water heaters. Global issues consisted of leaks with windows, stairwells, light
bulbs.

****

Jon [Kalsbeek] was in control, and we did what he told us to do.
Who's responsible for the global issues?
Q.
The POA through Jon.
A.
R. p. 391 at Dep. p. 95, LI. 9-19. Even replacing dishwashers units

if it had to be done in multiple

was a "global issue" for which FRPM needed Mr. Kalsbeek's "permission to go

forward." R. p. 392 at Dep. p. 239, L. 20 top. 240, L. 21; see also R. p. 394 at Dep. p. 318, L.

Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the other POA Board members. R. p. 646 at n.1.

3

13 top. 320, L. 11; R. p. 397-98 (Mr. Kalsbeek "insisted that [Mr. Drost] run any global issue
through [Mr. Kalsbeek]").
FRPM maintenance supervisor Sheila Thomason testified: "He [Mr. Kalsbeek]
micromanaged things that I did on a daily basis . . . . I'd have to include him on the e-mails or
report to him on daily things that happened." R. p. 403 at Dep. p. 66, LI. 11-17; see also R. p.
410 at Dep. p. 259, LI. 19-22 (Kalsbeek "micromanaged everything that we [FRPM] did"
(emphasis added)). Mr. Kalsbeek made it clear that he was "in charge" of all "decisions that
were made at Sagecrest." R. p. 409 at Dep. p. 219, L. 18 top. 220, L. 12. For example, Mr.
Kalsbeek required the on-site FRPM employees to keep a daily logbook of activities at
Sagecrest, and complained when he found it insufficiently detailed. R. pp. 458, 486 (logbook
included unit interior issues such as filter changes and CO testing). 2

2.

Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA's ability to micromanage FRPM is explained in
part by the POA's power to hire, fire, and set FRPM's compensation for
managing unit interiors.

Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA had financial leverage over FRPM. Sagecrest was FRPM's
largest account

not merely at the time of this tragedy, but ever. R. pp. 929-30 at Dep. p. 69,

L. 22 to p. 70, L. 25. Sagecrest constituted over twenty percent of the total units that FRPM
managed. R. p. 141 at ,r 14. FRPM was strongly motivated to keep the Sagecrest account.

2

The POA exercised control over unit interiors even prior to FRPM's management.
The POA - not individual owners - paid FRPM's predecessor, H & H Property Management,
Inc., to replace HV AC filters inside all Sagecrest apartments. R. p. 380 at Dep. p. 359, LL 8-22.

4

To keep its largest account, FRPM had to stay in the POA's good graces. Pursuant to
Section 6.6A of the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of the Multi Family Portion of the
Sagecrest Subdivision (Sagecrest's "CCR's"), all owners were required to use a property
manager of the POA's choosing to manage unit interiors. R. p. 96. 3 Thus, the POA owner, Mr. Switzer -

not the

decided whether FRPM would manage Unit 4624's interior. 4 The POA,

through Mr. Kalsbeek, actively enforced § 6.6A.

R. p. 388.

The POA hired FRPM as its

property manager on March 15, 2010. R. p. 98; R. p. 141 at, 18. Thus, on the same day, FRPM
became Mr. Switzer's property manager pursuant to § 6.6A. R. p. 104.
FRPM had two sources of compensation at Sagecrest: (1) a $150/month management fee
paid by the POA, and (2) 5% of monthly gross rental receipts. R. p. I 00 at, 6.1; R. p. 111. The
POA
5.3.

not owners -

set rental rates, and thus controlled monthly gross receipts. R. p. 106 at,

Thus, the POA controlled FRPM's compensation for all management at Sagecrest,

including management of unit interiors.
The POA paid FRPM's on-site employees' hourly wages. R. p. 100 at§ 5.1. The POA,
through Mr. Kalsbeek, had authority to grant or deny these employees' requests to work
overtime -

including on issues related to unit interiors. See R. p. 710.

For example, Mr.

3

Section 6.6A included a "grandfather clause" allowing owners who managed their
own units as of November 18, 2004 to continue doing so. R. p. 64 (handwritten notation: "ReRecord to add Section 6.6A per Sagecrest Property Owner's Association."); R. p. 96. Only four
of the forty-eight buildings were grandfathered. See R. p. 14 l at, 18. Apartment 4624 was not.
See R. p. 104.
4

The POA Board had autonomous power to select the property manager. See R. p.
841 (Board vote replacing FRPM with Verity Property Management).

5

Kalsbeek directed FRPM leasing manager Tara Gaertner to compile a spreadsheet of units with
hard-wired CO detectors. R. p. 708. Ms. Gaertner requested permission to work overtime to do
so as quickly as possible. R. p. 709. Mr. Kalsbeek denied her request. R. p. 710.
Sagecrest was the biggest account FRPM ever had. To keep it, FRPM had to stay in the
POA Board's good graces.
FRPM's activities -

3.

Mr. Kalsbeek used that leverage over FRPM to micromanage

including with respect to unit interiors.

The CCR's specifically grant the POA power to repair, maintain, and restore
unit interiors, including through its agent, FRPM.

A defendant owes duties resulting from control over a premises or agent, regardless of
whether that control was contractually authorized. See infra Parts III.A.1 and III.C.3. But, even
if only authorized control could result in liability, the POA's control here was authorized.
The CCR's set forth the POA and owners' respective rights and responsibilities. The
POA is responsible for maintaining unit exteriors and common areas. R. p. 68 at § 3.3(A).
Owners are responsible for maintaining unit interiors, as well as exterior windows, doors, and air
conditioning units. R. p. 69 at § 3.3(8). But, § 3.8 gives the POA Board the power to override
this division:
In the event the Owner of any Residential Lot improved with a Four Plex shall
fail to maintain any portion of such Owner's Residential Lot that Owner is
responsible to maintain, in a manner reasonable [sic] satisfactory to the Board,
after approval by vote of at least sixty percent (60%) of the members of the Board
present and voting and subject to such Owner's right to notice and a hearing
before the Board, the Association may, through its agents and employees, enter
upon the Residential Lot or Four Plex and repair, maintain and restore the
Residential Lot, or the Four Plex.

6

R. p. 70 (emphasis added). Section 3.8 establishes that the POA had the contractual authority to

repair, maintain, and restore unit interiors, including through its agent FRPM. Four things are
noteworthy about§ 3.8:
First, the substantive standard is "reasonabl[y] satisfactory to the Board"; the POA Board
has absolute discretion to act pursuant to § 3.8.
Second, although the Board is supposed to follow procedures and a hearing before the Board -

a Board vote, notice,

an owner has no recourse if the Board fails to do so.

Third, contrary to the district court's ruling below, § 3.8 applies to "any portion of such
Owner's Residential Lot that Owner is responsible to maintain." (emphasis added) Section 3.8
does not limit the POA's power to unit exteriors (versus interiors).
Fourth, § 3.8 authorizes the POA to act "through its agents"

i.e. FRPM. See also R. p.

75 at§ 6.7(A)(3) (POA may delegate powers to management company).

4.

Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA were long aware of the deadly CO threat.

On July 19, 201 l

well over a year prior to the deadly poisoning -

FRPM leasing

manager Tara Gaertner called Mr. Kalsbeek and informed him that tenants in an apartment were
exposed to such high levels of CO that, had they remained there for only another forty-five
minutes, they would have died. R. pp. 670-71 (email re: phone call). In subsequent emails, Mr.
Kalsbeek acknowledged the serious CO threat and its cause (water heaters clogging). R. pp.
673-676.
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On July 28, 2011, FRPM maintenance supervisor Sheila Thomason forwarded to Mr.
Kalsbeek a letter from Ben Davis of Express Plumbing, who had inspected the Sagecrest units
(hereinafter the "Ben Davis Letter"). R. p. 698 ("I have also attached a word doc I received from
Ben .... "); R. pp. 701-02 (letter). Mr. Davis sternly warned: "I would strongly recommend that

these {CO/ issues be solved before any tenants suffer health problems or death." R. pp. 701-02
(emphasis added). Ms. Thomason's email extensively discussed the CO threat. R. pp. 696-99.
Mr. Kalsbeek acknowledged that by August of 20 I I he was aware of "a serious potential
health problem with carbon monoxide issues" at Sagecrest. R. p. 687 at Dep. p. 219, LI. 10-15.
He was also aware of the necessity of installing hard-wired CO detectors "in each unit" to
prevent a tragedy. R. p. 383; see also R. p. 386 (email acknowledging need).
On October I 0, 2012 -

a month before this fatal poisoning -

the Meridian Fire

Department responded to a CO emergency involving Sagecrest tenant Molly Collins. R. p. 293.
The next day, FRPM leasing manager Tara Gaertner informed Mr. Kalsbeek about the incident
and repeated what he already knew: that battery-operated CO detectors were unreliable, and that
only hard-wired CO detectors could avert a poisoning. R. p. 704.

5.

Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA controlled hard-wired CO detector installation.

Mr. Kalsbeek, acting as POA President, established CO testing and detector-installation
procedures for Sagecrest. FRPM general manager Lizz Loop was adamant that the Procedures
were "Jon's way" -

i.e. "the way Jon [Kalsbeek] wanted to have the testing and the

maintenance done." R. p. 402 at Dep. p. 52, L. 24 to p. 53, L. 11. Ms. Gaertner explained that

8

Mr. Kalsbeek "came into town when we had that meeting and said, 'This [sic] is what the
procedures are going to be.' He laid them out for us." R. p. 437 at Dep. p. 301, L. 18 top. 302,

L. 11. Even Mr. Kalsbeek acknowledged that the Procedures were his. R. p. 458 (he drove
1,600 miles to "correct" the Procedures).
Under Mr. Kalsbeek's Procedures, installation of hard-wired combination smoke/CO
detectors was not scheduled to take place over any specific timeframe; rather, hard-wired CO
detectors would be installed on a piecemeal basis during events such as a tenant turnover or an
existing smoke detector's failure. R. p. 429 (March 20, 2012 Procedures); R. p. 829 (October 25,
2012 Procedures). Mr. Kalsbeek explained that under his Procedures owner approval was not
required for hard-wired CO detector installation. R. p. 415 at Transcript p. 14, LI. 2-18 ("There
is absolutely nothing about owners' approval."); R. p. 418 at Transcript p. 98, L. 25 top. 99, L. I
("[T]he smoke detector combo [i.e. combination smoke/CO detector] was not optional.").
Following the Molly Collins poisoning incident, the Meridian Fire Department warned
FRPM that battery-powered CO detectors were inadequate. R. p. 704. The next day, FRPM
leasing manager Tara Gaertner emailed Mr. Kalsbeek, pleading:

After yesterdays [sic] events I would like to have Chris [a handyman
contractor] go into every unit and check and make sure the CO detectors
that we installed are in working condition. The units that do not have CO
detectors I would like him to install one. . . . I would really like to do this to
take the heat off us. I talked to Chris, he would charge $25 per building to make
sure they are all good. If there is a unit that needs a CO detector it would be $55
for the detector and $25 for installing it. Please let me know your thoughts.
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Id. Mr. Kalsbeek did not respond that the POA lacked the power to rule on this request. Rather,
he stated: "I will talk to the board and see how the board wants to proceed." R. p. 461
(emphasis added); see also R. pp. 148-49 at ,r 69.
On October 15, 2012, Ms. Gaertner again stressed, "I don't think it should be optional to
have Chris [the handyman contractor] go in and make sure every unit has a working CO
detector." R. p. 705. Mr. Kalsbeek then requested a spreadsheet of which units had hard-wired
CO detectors, R. p. 708, which Ms. Gaertner provided, R. p. 710 ( covering email); R. pp. 713-16
(spreadsheet). During this extensive back-and-forth Mr. Kalsbeek never claimed that the POA
lacked control over when hard-wired CO detectors would be installed. 5
Mr. Kalsbeek then met with FRPM owner Tony Drost, FRPM general manager Lizz
Loop, and FRPM leasing manager Gaertner on October 25, 2012. R. p. 149 at ,r,r 70-71. He was
aware that only sixty-four out of one-hundred-and-ninety-two units had hard-wired CO detectors.
R. p. 415 at Transcript p. 13, L. 12 to p. 14, L. 2. Nonetheless, Mr. Kalsbeek stated that there
was no need to deviate from his Procedures. R. p. 149 at ,r 73; R. p. 416 at Transcript p. 17, LI.
15-16. Ms. Loop explained that Mr. Kalsbeek's Procedures prevented the immediate installation
of hard-wired CO detectors following the Molly Collins incident. R. p. 303-04 at Dep. p. 221, L.
9 to p. 222, L. 5. And so, by November 10, 2012, there was still no hard-wired CO detector in

5

On March 14, 2012 Ms. Gaertner drafted an email that clearly evidenced her
desire to immediately install hard-wired CO detectors in all units. R. p. 442 ("I recommend
putting CO combo detectors in every unit and be done with it."). Although Ms. Gaertner did not
send this particular email to Mr. Kalsbeek, it is further evidence that FRPM would have carried
through with this plan, but for Mr. Kalsbeek's Procedures to the contrary and insistence that his
Procedures be followed.
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Apartment 4624. See R. p. 715. 6 Mr. Kalsbeek's piecemeal installation Procedures directly
contributed to Mr. Forbush's death and Ms. Halowell's brain injury. 7

6.

Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA controlled whether a professional plumber would
be hired to perform preventative maintenance.

On April 15, 2011, FRPM maintenance supervisor Sheila Thomason emailed Mr.
Kalsbeek, explaining that only a professional plumber would have sufficient training to perform
effective preventative maintenance on the Sagecrest water heaters. R. p. 424. Mr. Kalsbeek
objected to this life-saving precaution as too expensive. Id.
On April 18, 2011, Ms. Gaertner forwarded Mr. Kalsbeek the cost of professional
maintenance. R. p. 427. Ms. Gaertner specifically asked Mr. Kalsbeek to decide whether to hire
a professional: "Please let me know the next step. Do I schedule to have this done periodically,
or as the problem arises?" Id. Mr. Kalsbeek did not respond that the POA lacked authority to
make this decision. Inste.ad, he replied: "Let us review this and get back to you next week." Id.
But Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA never got back to her.

As a result, the air intake on the

unmaintained water heater in Apartment 4624 clogged, the water heater produced a deadly level
of CO, and Mr. Forbush was killed and Ms. Halowell was severely injured.

6

FRPM provided a CO detector to Ms. Kipper (it was battery-powered), but it did
not work. See R. p. 966.
7

Hard-wired detectors could have been installed in a single day to prevent the
disaster: on November 12, 2012 - two days too late
hard-wired CO detectors were installed
in all remaining units. R. p. 3 76 at Dep. p. 278, LI. 5-15; R. p. 3 76 at Dep. p. 278, LI. 16-18.
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7.

Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA controlled whether owners and tenants would
receive adequate warnings of the deadly CO threat.

On March 9, 2012, Mr. Kalsbeek instructed Ms. Gaertner not to send information
regarding the deadly CO threat to owners or tenants.

R. p. 448.

A reasonable juror could

conclude that, through this email, Mr. Kalsbeek 8 was asserting his right to control the flow of
information about the CO threat to owners and tenants. Ms. Gartner confirmed this. R. p. 435 at
Dep. p. 241, L. 23 to p. 242, L. 11.
Similarly, FRPM maintenance supervisor Sheila Thomason wanted to provide the Ben
Davis Letter to all owners. Mr. Kalsbeek forbade her from doing so:
THE WITNESS:
I wanted to send the information [the Ben Davis letter] to
every single owner at Sagecrest.
Q. (BY MR. PALMER)
Did you tell Jon that, Jon Kalsbeek?
A.
Yes, I did.

Q.

****

What was Jon's response when you said that you wanted to send [the
letter] to every single owner?
A.
He said, "Absolutely not."
Q.
Did he say why? Did you ask him why?
He wanted to be the one in charge of distributing this type of
A.
information to the individual - individual owners at Sagecrest.
R. p. 406 at Dep. p. 140, L. I to p. 141, L. 11 (emphasis added). The only thing preventing Ms.
Thomason from distributing the Ben Davis Letter was Mr. Kalsbeek's command not to:

Q.

Was there anything that prevented you from sending it [the Ben Davis
Letter] to the entire ownership?
A.
Jon [Kalsbeek] asked me not to.
Other than that, was there anything else that prevented you from sending it
Q.
to the entire ownership?
A.
No.
8

Furthermore, use of "we" indicates that Mr. Kalsbeek was speaking for the POA.
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R. p. 408 at Dep. p. 195, LI. 8-14; see also R. p. 407 at Dep. p. 193, L. 15 to p. 194, L. 17 ("[Mr.
Kalsbeek] wanted to review anything that I [Ms. Thomason] sent out to the owners .... ").
A reasonable juror could conclude that Apartment 4624 owner Mr. Switzer would have
taken action if he had seen Mr. Davis's stark warning: "I would strongly recommend that these

issues be solved before any tenants suffer health problems or death." R. p. 702 (emphasis
added). Moreover, a reasonable juror could conclude that Apartment 4624 tenant Adra Kipper
would have taken action if she had ever received an adequate warning about the CO threat. 9

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED

A.

Do genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on whether Mr.
Kalsbeek and the POA owed premises liability duties?

B.

Do genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on whether Mr.
Kalsbeek and the POA owed duties based on their voluntary undertakings?

C.

Do genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on whether the POA
is vicariously liable for FRPM's acts and omissions?

D.

Do genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on whether Mr.
Kalsbeek is liable for his own acts and omissions, even if undertaken in his capacity
as POA President?

9

Ms. Kipper was informed that there was a potential CO issue by written notice
that stated that her water heater would be replaced within the next week, without further notice
of entry into her apartment. R. p. 239. Ms. Kipper reasonably assumed that this had been done
and that the danger had been eliminated. R. p. 242 at Dep. p. 34, LI. 6-15.
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III.

ARGUMENT

This Court recently summarized the standard of review:
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, and apply the
same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Summary
judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." I.R.C.P. 56( c ). All reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record
are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, and disputed facts are liberally
construed in the nonmoving party's favor. If reasonable people could reach
different conclusions or inferences from the evidence, summary judgment is
inappropriate.

Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass'n, 160 Idaho 181, 186, 370 P.3d 384, 389 (2016) (case
citations omitted), reh 'g denied (Mar. 10, 2016).
Although normally a question of law, the existence of a duty becomes a question of fact
when it depends on disputed facts. See Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. # 25, 149 Idaho 679,
686, 239 P.3d 784, 791 (20 I 0) ("Normally, the foreseeability of a risk of harm, and thus whether
a duty consequently attaches, is a question of fact reserved for the jury."); Coghlan v. Beta Theta

Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 402, 987 P.2d 300, 314 ( 1999) (questions of fact regarding whether
defendant assumed a duty through a voluntary undertaking precluded summary judgment).

A.

Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on whether Mr.
Kalsbeek and the POA owed premises liability duties.
1.

Premises liability duties depend on, and are proportional to, a defendant's
actual control. Here, a reasonable juror could find that Mr. Kalsbeek and
the POA actually controlled (a) hard-wired CO detector installation; (b)
professional preventative maintenance; and (c) warnings to owners and
tenants.
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"[T]he general rule of premises liability is that one having control of the premises may be
liable for failure to keep the premises in repair." Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257,261,245 P.3d
1009, 1013 (2011) (quoting Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 713, 8 P.3d 1254,
1256 (Ct. App. 2000)).
The test is actual control. Cook v. Bay Area Renaissance Festival of Largo, Inc., 164 So.
3d 120, 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) ("In determining premises liability, the party's ability to
exercise control over the premises is the relevant question; ownership of and title to the premises
are irrelevant."); ENGlobal U.S., Inc. v. Gatlin, 449 S.W.3d 269,277 (Tex. App. 2014) ("Control
over the premises can be proven by a contractual agreement assigning a right of control or by
evidence of actual control." (emphasis added)).
The POA actually exercised control over important aspects of unit interiors: (a) hardwired CO detector installation; (b) professional preventative maintenance; and ( c) warnings to
owners and tenants. 10 It is no defense that the POA did not assert control over all aspects of unit
interiors; the duty owed is proportional to the control exercised. Johnson v. Steffen, 685 N.E.2d
1117, 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) ("When a case involves a non-owner, liability turns upon the
degree of control such person or entity exercises over the premises."); La China v. Woodlands
Operating Co., L.P., 417 S.W.3d 516,522 (Tex. App. 2013) ("Duty in the context of premises
liability is commensurate with the right of control." ( citation and internal quotation marks
10

To the extent there is doubt about who controlled the property and thus whether a
duty existed, that doubt is for the jury to resolve. See Nagel v. N Ind Pub. Serv. Co., 26 N.E.3d
30, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) ("[W]hether a duty exists in premises liability cases may depend
upon resolution of underlying facts by the trier of fact, including questions regarding who
controlled the property at the time and place of an accident.").
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omitted)). Because Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA actually exercised control 11 over specific aspects
of the property that caused the poisoning, they owed commensurate duties.

2.

Even if rightful control were a prerequisite to premises liability duties, a
reasonable juror could find that Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA had a right to
control unit interiors.

Even if the test were rightfitl control, rather than actual control, summary judgment is
still improper.

CCR's § 3.8 gave the POA Board absolute discretion to deem an owner's

maintenance of his or her property unsatisfactory. The POA could then enter upon the property
and repair, maintain, or restore it, including through its agent, FRPM. Regardless of the usual
division of responsibility, the POA could override that division at will.
The district court disregarded§ 3.8, holding that it authorized the POA to make repairs to
the few exterior areas -

windows, doors, and air conditioning units -

that owners normally

were required to maintain. R. p. 980. This interpretation is incompatible with the plain text of§
3.8. See supra Part I.C.3. The district court improperly inserted the word "exterior" into § 3.8,
despite the fact that the POA itself did not see fit to include that word. See Bondy v. Levy, 121
Idaho 993, 997, 829 P.2d 1342, 1346 (1992) ("[C]ourts cannot revise the contract .... ").
And, even assuming arguendo that § 3.8 was ambiguous, that merely creates fact
questions for the jury. Pocatello Ho.5p., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Inv 'r, LLC, 156 Idaho 709,

ll

Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA may argue that no premises liability duties exist
absent rightful control. This is contrary to the law and suggests terrible public policy - a
defendant should not be rewarded with impunity merely because its exercise of control was
without proper authority. "Two wrongs don't make a right." Fetterly v. Paskett, 744 F. Supp.
966, 974 (D. Idaho 1990) (per Callister, J.).
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720, 330 P.3d 1067, 1078 (20 l

(interpretation of ambiguous contract is question of fact). The

POA's construction of§ 3.8 through its course of dealings unit interiors -

it did, in fact, exercise control over

is powerful evidence that § 3.8 allowed such action. Id. at 721, 330 P.3d at 1079

("A course of dealing is a pattern of conduct between the parties that may be used as evidence of
how the parties intended the contract to be interpreted; it is evidence of the construction the
parties placed on the language of the contract."); see also City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 154
Idaho 425, 439, 299 P.3d 232, 246 (2013). The POA cannot now disclaim the very authority it
previously wielded.

3.

It is irrelevant to Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA's liability that unit owner
Matthew Switzer also owed, and also breached, premises liability duties.

A property owner's failure to discharge its duties does not excuse a non-owner with
control over the property from discharging its parallel duties. See Metsker v. Carefree/Scott

Fetzer Co., 90 So. 3d 973, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) ("Two or more parties may share
control over land or business premises. Under these circumstances, the fact that there may be
joint responsibility or control over premises does not relieve a party from responsibility. . . . In
addition, the fact that more than one person is under a duty and one fails to perform is no defense
to one who has assumed control." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Mr.

Kalsbeek and the POA cannot defend on the grounds that owner Mr. Switzer also owed premises
liability duties and also breached those duties.
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B.

Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on whether Mr.
Kalsbeek and the POA owed duties resulting from voluntary undertakings.
1.

A reasonable juror could find that Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA voluntarily
undertook to decide whether: (a) hard-wired CO detectors would be timely
installed; (b) a professional plumber would be hired to perform preventative
maintenance; and (c) tenants and guests would receive adequate warnings of
the deadly CO threat.

"A legal duty may arise if one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior
duty to do so. In such a case, the acting party has a duty to perform that act in a non-negligent
manner."

Am. Bank v. BRN Dev., Inc., 159 Idaho 201, 207, 358 P.3d 762, 768 (2015)

(alternations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted).

Although assumed duties

frequently arise out of safety-related undertakings, any type of voluntary undertaking may result
in an assumed duty. See Beers v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day

Saints, 155 Idaho 680,688 n.5, 316 P.3d 92, 100 n.5 (2013) ("We do not intend to suggest that
assumed duties exist only in the context of safety-related undertakings.").
The scope of an assumed duty is a question of fact.

See Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi

Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,402,987 P.2d 300,314 (1999) (questions of fact regarding whether
defendant assumed a duty through a voluntary undertaking precluded summary judgment); Jones

v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, Chartered, 125 Idaho 607, 612, 873 P.2d 861, 866 (1994)
("[T]here is a genuine issue of material fact whether [defendant] undertook a voluntary duty ...
•"). 12

As shown above, there is ample evidence that Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA voluntarily
12

See also Steele v. Maren Eng'g Corp., 460 F. Supp. 2d 877, 884 (S.D. Ind. 2005)
("Whether defendant has assumed a duty and the extent of the duty it assumed are usually
questions of fact for the jury to determine."); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fleischer, 890 F. Supp.
972, 981 (D. Kan. 1995) ("The precise scope of the duties [defendant] assumed necessarily
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undertook to decide whether: (a) hard-wired CO detectors would be timely installed; (b) a
professional plumber would be hired to perform preventative maintenance; and (c) tenants and
guests would receive adequate warnings of the deadly CO threat.

2.

A reasonable juror could find that FRPM relied on Mr. Kalsbeek and the
POA to make these decisions.

Idaho requires reliance on an undertaking before a duty attaches. This may be reliance by
someone who would have otherwise prevented the harm -

as opposed to reliance by the injured

person. 13 See Baccus v. Ameripride Servs., Inc., 145 Idaho 346, 352, 179 P.3d 309, 315 (2008).
In Baccus, Bechtel hired AmeriPride to place non-slip mats in the entries to Bechtel's
work facility.

Id. at 348, 179 P.3d at 311.

The disputed facts allowed an inference that

AmeriPride failed to place a mat in an entry. Id. at 348, 352-53, 179 P.3d at 311, 315-16.
Baccus, a Bechtel worker, slipped in the entry and was injured. Id. at 348, 179 P.3d at 311. The
opinion does not so much as hint that Baccus ever had any dealings with AmeriPride, knew that
AmeriPride existed, or consciously relied on any entity to provide non-slip mats. Nonetheless,
this Court reversed a grant of summary judgment for AmeriPride on the grounds that AmeriPride
voluntarily assumed a duty. This Court emphasized that Bechtel relied on AmeriPride to provide

involves a weighing of the facts, a task inappropriate for the court upon summary judgment.");
Smith v. State, 921 P.2d 632, 634-35 (Alaska 1996) ("Where reasonable people could differ over
the nature and extent of the act undertaken, summary judgment is inappropriate, since the scope
of the assumed duty will vary depending on the inferences drawn from the facts."); Vaughn v.
Daniels Co., 841 N.E.2d 1133, 1144 (Ind. 2006) ("Whether a party has assumed a duty and the
extent of that duty, if any, are questions for the trier of fact.").
13

The district court agreed that reliance by "[tenant Adra] Kipper, or even some
other party" would suffice, but erroneously held there was no such evidence. R. p. 987.
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mats, noting that "[h]ad AmeriPride not agreed to place the mats at the entry, Bechtel likely
would have found another company to fulfill that duty." Id. at 352, 179 P.3d at 315. Thus,
"AmeriPride induced Bechtel's reliance on AmeriPride's promise to replace the safety mats,
which increased the risk that a Bechtel employee such as plaintiff could slip, fall, and sustain
injury were the promise not kept." Id. (emphasis added). The requisite reliance necessary for a
voluntary-undertaking duty to attach may be reliance by someone who would have otherwise
prevented the harm (rather than the person harmed). 14
Here, a reasonable juror could find that FRPM was relying on Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA
to decide whether: (a) hard-wired CO detectors would be timely installed; (b) a professional
plumber would be hired to perform preventative maintenance; and (c) tenants and guests would
receive adequate warnings of the deadly CO threat.
Control Inducing Reliance:

The POA had the power to hire, fire, and set the

compensation for FRPM's management for all of Sagecrest, including unit interiors.

It

controlled the hours that on-site FRPM employees worked, including on unit-interior issues. The
POA

and specifically Mr. Kalsbeek -

micromanaged FRPM's activities, including those

affecting unit interiors. Thus, Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA created a dynamic where FRPM relied
-

and could not act without -

Mr. Kalsbeek giving the POA's "ok."

14

This comports with the textbook example of a voluntary undertaking: attempting
to rescue a drowning person. See, e.g., Beers v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680, 688, 316 P.3d 92, I 00 (2013) (noting this paradigmatic
example). Of course, the drowning swimmer is already in peril, and cannot change his or her
conduct based on the would-be rescuer's attempt; however, other potential rescuers are likely to
forbear upon seeing that a rescue is already underway.
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Hard-Wired CO Detector Installation:

Complying with Mr. Kalsbeek's assertion of

control, FRPM leasing manager Tara Gaertner asked Mr. Kalsbeek for permission to
immediately install hard-wired CO detectors in all units. Mr. Kalsbeek never said that he lacked
the power to make this decision.
installation.

Instead, he created written Procedures for piecemeal

He then re-affirmed his written Procedures after the Molly Collins poisoning

incident. A reasonable juror could find that, if FRPM had not been relying on Mr. Kalsbeek's
decision-making, it would have immediately installed hard-wired CO detectors in all units.
Professional Preventative Maintenance: FRPM maintenance supervisor Sheila Thomason
informed Mr. Kalsbeek that a professional plumber should be hired to perform preventative
maintenance on the Sagecrest water heaters. FRPM understood that it was necessary for the
POA, and specifically Mr. Kalsbeek, to evaluate and authorize that course of action.

Ms.

Gaertner asked Mr. Kalsbeek whether to hire a professional plumber and provided follow-up
expense information. Mr. Kalsbeek never said that he lacked the power to make this decision.
Instead, he delayed making any decision until it was too late. A reasonable juror could find that,
if FRPM had not been relying on Mr. Kalsbeek's decision-making, it would have hired a
professional plumber to perform preventative maintenance.
Warnings: Mr. Kalsbeek ordered Ms. Thomason not to share the Ben Davis Letter with
owners. The only reason that Ms. Thomason did not send this dire letter is that she relied on Mr.
Kalsbeek to make that decision. Mr. Kalsbeek also asserted control over Ms. Gaertner's warning
attempts. A reasonable juror could find that, if FRPM had not been relying on Mr. Kalsbeek's
decision-making, it would have provided adequate warnings to owners and tenants.
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In Baccus, had AmeriPride not agreed to place mats in entryways, Bechtel would have
hired a different contractor to do the work, thereby preventing Baccus's injuries. Similarly here,
had Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA not asserted decision-making authority over hard-wired CO
detector installation, professional preventative maintenance, and warnings, then FRPM would
have taken specific proposed actions that would have prevented Mr. Forbush's death and Ms.
Halowell's injuries.

C.

Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on whether the POA is
vicariously liable for FRPM's acts and omissions.
1.

A reasonable juror could find that FRPM was the POA's agent with respect
to: (a) installing hard-wired CO detectors; (b) hiring a professional plumber
to perform preventative maintenance; and (c) providing warnings to owners
and tenants.

"A principal is liable for the torts of an agent committed within the scope of the agency
relationship." Sharp v. W.H Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 303, 796 P.2d 506, 512 (1990); see

also Navo v. Bingham Mem'l Hosp., No. 42540, 2016 WL 1638245, at *13 (Idaho Apr. 26,
2016), reh'g denied (June 9, 2016) ("One consequence of an agency relationship is that the
principal becomes liable for the torts committed by the agent within the scope of agency.").
The existence and scope of an agency relationship is a question of fact. See Agrisource,

Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903, 909, 332 P.3d 815, 821 (2014) ("Agency is generally a fact
question for the jury when the evidence discloses corroborative facts."); Clark v. Tarr, 76 Idaho
383, 391, 283 P.2d 942, 947 (1955) ("[T]he nature and extent of the authority of an agent and
whether the act or contract in controversy was within the scope of his authority are, under the
evidence, questions of fact to be determined by the jury or other trier of facts .... ").
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"[A]gency may be proven by circumstances and course of dealing between the parties"
and "the relationship of the parties to each other and to the subject matter." Adkison Corp. v.

Am. Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 409, 690 P.2d 341, 344 (1984). The POA had the power to hire,
fire, and set FRPM's compensation with respect to unit interiors. Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA
actually exercised control over FRPM's acts and omissions with respect to hard-wired CO
detector installation, professional preventative maintenance, and warnings. Thus, at least with
respect to those issues, FRPM was the POA's agent.

2.

It is no defense that the POA and individual owners had concurrent,
overlapping control over FRPM.

A single agent may serve two or more principals, even with respect to the same
transaction. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1250 (10th Cir. 2013)
("An agent can serve multiple principals at once .... "); Wallulis v. Dymowski, 918 P.2d 755,
764 (Or. 1996) ("[A]n agent can serve two principals."); C&R Forestry, Inc. v. Consol. Human

Res., AZ, Inc., No. 05-cv-381, 2007 WL 914198, at*4 (D. Idaho Mar. 23, 2007) (allegations and
evidence that agent served defendant X did not foreclose possibility that agent also served
defendant Y, because "a person may be the agent of multiple principals"); see also Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 226 ( I 958) ("A person may be the servant of two masters, not joint
employers, at one time as to one act, if the service to one does not involve abandonment of the
service to the other.") (cited with approval by Judge Lodge in C&R Forestry, supra);
Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 3. I 6 (2006); see also Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 7 .03
cmt. d (2006) ("An agent who commits a tort may have more than one principal .... ").
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That owner Mr. Switzer could also direct FRPM's activities in his units does not absolve
the POA of liability. The POA exercised control over FRPM's activities and prevented FRPM
from taking specific actions that would have saved Mr. Forbush and Ms. Halowell from harm.

3.

A principal-agent relationship depends on the entities' actual relationship.

The POA may argue that it had no contractual right to control FRPM's activities in unit
interiors. The governing test is the control that the principal actually exercises in real life, not
the control that the principal supposedly is entitled to exercise on paper. See Barefoot v. Int'!

Bhd. ofTeamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers ofAm., 424 F.2d 1001, 1004-05 (10th
Cir. 1970) ("An agency relationship may, of course, be established through actual conduct of the
parties and regardless of written or other specific authority negativing or limiting the existence or
extent of an agency."); In re M/V Rickmers Genoa Litig., 622 F. Supp. 2d 56, 74 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) ("[B]ecause agency is determined according to extant factual circumstances, a contractual
disclaimer or acknowledgement of agency is not dispositive for purposes of determining whether
an agency relationship exists as a matter of law."); Tomlinson v. G.E. Capital Dealer Distrib.

Fin., Inc., 624 So. 2d 565, 567 (Ala. 1993) ("[T]erms of a contract disavowing any agency
relationship between the parties to a contract will not conclusively establish the absence of
control."); Hylton v. Koontz, 636, 532 S.E.2d 252, 257 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) ("It is not
dispositive that a contract denies the existence of an agency relationship, if in fact the
relationship was that of agent-principal."); Thornton v. Ford Motor Co., 297 P.3d 413, 419
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(Okla. Civ. App. 2012) ("If the facts show actual control by the principal, an agency is
established regardless of the contract language.").
A contrary ruling would yield unjust results.

A principal that wanted to avoid tort

liability for its agent's acts and omissions could simply limit the agent's authority by contract.
The principal could then disregard the contract, and insist on exerting a broader scope of control
over the agent. If the agent refused, the principal could simply fire the agent and hire one willing
to abide by the de facto scope of the agency relationship. Such was the case here. Regardless of
whether the POA had the right to direct FRPM's activities in unit interiors pursuant to CCR's §
3.8 -

although this was the case -

the POA could remove FRPM as the manger of unit

interiors if FRPM disobeyed the POA's directions regarding unit interiors. This would deprive
FRPM of its largest account ever. The POA leveraged its power over FRPM and did, in fact,
exercise control over FRPM's acts and omissions regarding hard-wired CO detector installation,
professional preventative maintenance, and warnings. That control existed regardless of any
attempted disclaimer in the CCR's.

D.

Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on whether Mr.
Kalsbeek is liable for his own acts and omissions - regardless of capacity.
Mr. Kalsbeek may contend that he cannot be held individually liable because he was

acting as the POA president. 15 Any such argument is contrary to Idaho law.

15

The district court did not grant summary judgment on this basis.
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1.

Corporate officers and directors are liable for their own acts and omissions.

That a corporate officer or director committed a tort while acting within the scope of his
or her duties is no defense. See VFP VCv. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326,334, 109 P.3d 714, 722
(2005) (approving of jury instruction stating: "to be held liable a corporate director must
specifically direct, actively participate in, or knowingly acquiesce in the fraud or other
wrongdoing of the corporation or its officers"), abrogated on other grounds by Wandering

Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586, 591, 329 P.3d 368, 373 (2014)
(abrogating only VFP's suggestion that a jury may decide the equitable issue of veil piercing);

Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404-05, 848 P.2d 984, 988-89 (Ct. App. 1992) ("A director
who personally participates in a tort is personally liable to the victim, even though the
corporation might also be vicariously liable .... 'Participation' may be found on the basis of
direct action, but also may consist of knowing approval or ratification of the unlawful acts of
others."); see also L.B. Indus., Inc. v. Smith, 817 F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir. 1987). 16 "Whether
defendant approved of, directed, actively participated in, or cooperated in the negligent conduct
is a question of fact for the jury." Hoang v. Arbess, 80 P.3d 863, 868 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
There is ample evidence of Mr. Kalsbeek' s active participation for a jury to hold him liable.

2.

Idaho Code § 30-30-406 is inapposite.

Mr. Kalsbeek may argue that he is absolutely immune under I.C. § 30-30-406 (codified
as l.C. § 30-3-39 at the time of the briefing below), which provides: "A member of a corporation
16

This principle applies equally to nonprofit and for-profit corporations.

See

Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass 'n, Inc., 517 F.2d 1141, 1 144 (4th Cir. 1975).
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is not, as such, personally liable for the acts, debts, liabilities or obligations of the corporation."
But the statute plainly protects members from vicarious liability for the acts "of the

corporation"; not direct liability for their own torts. Moreover, this Court "will not interpret a
statute as abrogating the common law unless it is evident that was the Legislature's intent."

Pioneer Irr. Dist. v. City of Caldwell, 153 Idaho 593, 601-02, 288 P.3d 810, 818-19 (2012).
Section 406 evinces no intent to abrogate the common law discussed in Part III.D.1 above.
Finally, twisting § 30-30-406 to provide absolute immunity in this context would have
dangerous consequences, "enable[ing] a director or officer of a corporation to perpetrate flagrant
injuries and escape liability behind the shield of his representative character, even though the
corporation might be insolvent or irresponsible." Ben-Yishay v. Mastercraft Dev., LLC, 553 F.
Supp. 2d 1360, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2008).

3.

An J.C. § 30-30-623 affirmative defense cannot be resolved on summary
judgment.

Mr. Kalsbeek may argue that he is immune under J.C. § 30-30-623 (codified as LC. § 303-85 at the time of the briefing below). Section 623 provides in pertinent part:
(1)

An officer with discretionary authority shall discharge his duties under
that authority:
(a)
In good faith;
(b)
With the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances; and
(c)
In a manner the officer reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation and its members, if any.

(4)

An officer is not liable to the corporation, any member, or other person for
any action taken or not taken as an officer, if the officer acted in
compliance with this section.

****
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Section 623 has three elements: the defendant must have acted (1) in good faith; (2) with
the care of an ordinarily prudent person in a like position under similar circumstances; and (3) in
a manner the defendant reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation and its
members. Any § 623 argument fails here:
First, Mr. Kalsbeek did not meet his burden of establishing that he was entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Mr. Kalsbeek presented an affidavit that parroted § 623 's
elements verbatim, rather than setting forth evidentiary facts proving that he actually acted in
good faith, prudently, and under the belief that his actions were in the best interests of the POA
and its members. R. pp. 530-32 at ,i,i 10-12. When a defendant moves for summary judgment
based on an affirmative defense, the defendant must offer evidence proving each element of that
defense. See Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765,771,215 P.3d 485,491 (2009).
Conclusory statements are not admissible evidence. Esser Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics

Techs., Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 917, 188 P.3d 854, 859 (2008). A summary judgment affidavit must
set forth evidentiary facts
-

i.e. "information as to what took place, an act, an incident, a reality"

rather than unsubstantiated "ultimate facts" or "legal conclusions." Ainsworth v. Progressive

Cas. Ins. Co., 322 P.3d 6, 11 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). Moreover, in order to be admissible, lay
opinion testimony must be "(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful
to a clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue,
and (c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule
702."

I.R.E. 701.

Lay witness testimony that merely tells the jury what result to reach is
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inadmissible. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 155 P.3d 909, 915 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (reversing; trial
court erred by allowing witness to testify in a manner that parroted elements of crime).
Mr. Kalsbeek cannot establish that he is entitled to summary judgment merely by copying
the elements of an immunity statute and pasting them into an affidavit. See Hall v. Bean, 416
S.W.3d 490 (Tex. App. 2013). In Hall, homeowners sued HOA officers for breach of fiduciary
duty. The officers moved for summary judgment, relying on affidavits that stated:
All decisions I made as an officer were made in good faith, and I exercised
ordinary care and sought the input of other board members before making my
decisions that are being challenged in this litigation. I believe that all the decisions
I have made as an officer were in the best interests of the Association.

Id. at 494. The district court granted summary judgment. The appellate court reversed, holding:
"None of the affidavits provide any underlying facts to support the assertions in this paragraph,
and therefore the statements are merely conclusory.

Because conclusory statements in an

affidavit are not competent summary-judgment evidence, the officers failed to establish that they
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. As in Hall, Mr. Kalsbeek's cut-and-paste
affidavit is inadmissible and insufficient to establish that he is entitled to summary judgment.
Second, even if Mr. Kalsbeek's affidavit was sufficient to create a prima facie case for
summary judgment, the record is replete with conflicting facts for the jury to resolve.
"[S]ummary judgment is notoriously inappropriate for determination of claims in which issues of
intent, good faith and other subjective feelings play dominant roles." Ashman v. Barrows, 438
F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting McGreal v. Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657, 677 (7th Cir. 2004)).
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Here, § 623's first and third elements depend on Mr. Kalsbeek's subjective good faith and
beliefs.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, a reasonable juror
easily could find that by preventing FRPM from carrying through with its proposed plans to
immediately install hard-wired CO detectors in all units, to hire a professional plumber to
preform preventative maintenance, and to provide adequate warnings to owners and tenants, Mr.
Kalsbeek was not acting in good faith, prudently, and in the best interests of the POA and its
members. These are issues for the jury to decide.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The district court wrongly held that Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA owed no duties. It based
this ruling on erroneous findings that were contrary to voluminous disputed facts. A reasonable
juror could find the facts necessary to impose duties on Mr. Kalsbeek and the POA under
premises liability, voluntary undertakings, and agency theories. Plaintiffs respectfully request
that this Court reverse the summary judgments, and remand to allow a jury to resolve the
disputed facts.
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